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Abstract:
We use a rich longitudinal data set for West Germany to disentangle the wage eﬀects for female
workers around first birth. Data on daily real wages reveal a dip in women’s real wages shortly
before giving birth and a drop of 10 to 20 percent after finishing maternity leave and returning
to the labour market. To pinpoint what drives the movement in wages around the first birth,
we analyse the wages of women, taking into account the potential correlation of the duration
of individual interruptions due to parental leave with other unobserved individually specific
factors and non random sample selection. In order to identify the causes of the movements in
wages we exploit the panel structure of the data, regional variations in access to child care and
female unemployment rates, as well as policy changes, which increased the maximum duration
of parental leave from 6 months to 3 years.
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1 Introduction
The fact that women earn less after having children is called the child penalty
and has been examined in a number of articles. With few exceptions most studies
find the existence of a child penalty. While this fact seems well established, it is
less clear how the wage gap arises.
To motivate our analysis we start by showing movements in wages for women
around the time of the first birth. To do this we use the German IABS sample1
from which we have selected a sample of young women who gave birth to their
first child within the sample period. To highlight the wage eﬀects around first
birth we have sorted the data according to date of first birth. In Figure 1, mean
wages2 are shown for unskilled, skilled and graduate women.3 The vertical line
represents the year in which maternity leave is taken: the negative numbers on
the x-axis refer to the number of years before the first birth while the positive
numbers on the x-axis refer to the number of years after the first birth. As the
graph clearly points out, there are strong wage eﬀects around the first birth. This
graph also shows that for unskilled and graduates, this fall in wages begins prior
to giving birth.
[figure 1]
This raises three main issues that we address in this study. First, what is produc-
1Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Sample (more detals on the sample will be
provided later).
2The wages are defined as the logarithm of daily wages. Only wages corresponding to full
time employment are included.
3The definition of education groups is such that unskilled and low skilled are labelled un-
skilled. The group of skilled contains apprentices (vocationally skilled) and graduates contains
individuals with a university degree.
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ing the fall in wages before birth.4 Second, what factors account for the dramatic
fall in wages after maternity leave. Third, is the earnings profile flatter after
giving birth than before and if so, what accounts for this flatter profile.
The starting point of our analysis is the human capital theory model of Becker
(1964) and Mincer (1974). To analyse movements in wages we use a framework
similar to the one used by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) in their study
of earnings losses for displaced workers. The key parameters are the return to
work experience and the loss from interruptions. In order to identify these pa-
rameters, taking into account unobserved heterogeneity and non-random sample
selection, we make use of the panel structure of the data and use lagged variables
as instruments as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). We also exploit pol-
icy changes that increased the maximum duration of parental leave several times
from 6 months in the mid 1980s to 3 years in the 1990s. Finally, we also use
regional variations in female unemployment rates and child care provision to help
to identify the parameters of the model.
The main source of data, is the IABS data for 1975 to 1995. The IABS is
the equivalent social security earnings data in the U.S. and, as such, contains
particularly reliable information about wages and work histories. From this data
set we extract a sample of young females, aged 20 to 39. All of them are followed
over their entire career from the beginning onwards. This data sample oﬀers
particular advantages for this type of analysis, because first, we can measure
actual work experience before and after the interruption as well as the duration
of the interruption. Second, we can control for diﬀerence in education, age,
firm change and occupation. Third, we can observe a large number of workers
4The fact that wages/earnings drop prior to an interruption is also found in other branches
of the literature; for interruptions due to training see Ashenfelter (1978) and for interruptions
due to displacement see Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993).
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over a long period of time that includes the first interruption due to maternity
leave. For more than 25,000 females we observe wages before first birth, and for
approximately 10,000 we observe wages both before and after birth. In addition,
we observe females who remain childless (about 1,800) and we use the observations
in order to compare the wage profiles of mothers and women who remain childless.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a short review of the lit-
erature. Section 3 describes institutional features of the maternity and parental
leave schemes in Germany. Section 4 contains the data description and section
5 presents the econometric model. Section 6 discusses the estimation results and
finally, in section 7, we conclude.
2 Previous evidence
Most of the studies examining eﬀects of maternity leave and children have been
concerned with the eﬀects on labour supply and the timing of births. Only a few
empirical studies investigate the impact of maternity leave and having children
on the individual wage process. The most common approach for analyse the wage
eﬀect of having children has been to estimate a child penalty, i.e. comparing the
wages of women with children to those of childless women when controlling for
observed characteristics. The diﬀerence in wages is often called the family gap.
Although the evidence is mixed, most studies find a significant child penalty. A
significant child penalty is found for the US (see Anderson, Binder and Krause
(2002) and Waldfogel (1998)), for the UK (see Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999))
and for Canada (see Phipps, Burton and Lethbrigde (2001)). On the other hand
no evidence of a child penalty is found for Denmark (see Datta Gupta and Smith
(2002) or for Sweden (see Albrecht et al., 1999))5.
5For more details on these studies see Appendix A, table A1 at the end of this paper.
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In the literature diﬀerent hypotheses for the existence of a child penalty have
been oﬀered. One potential explanation for the lower wages of mothers is that
women with children have interruptions to their labour market career due to a
maternity leave spell. The interruption will result in less work experience of
mothers compared to childless women. In Waldfogel (1998), this problem is
addressed by using actual experience instead of potential experience, but she still
finds a significant child penalty for women. A similar approach is used to study
Danish women in Datta Gupta and Smith (2002), who do not find evidence for
a child penalty. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that interruptions could
have negative eﬀects on earnings. These negative eﬀects can be explained by
depreciation of the human capital (Mincer and Polachek (1974)). Albrecht et al.
(1999) analyse the eﬀect of an interruption on subsequent earnings using Swedish
data. They find negative eﬀects for an interruption, and, furthermore, they find
that there are diﬀerent eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of interruptions. Interruptions
due to unemployment cause greater losses than interruptions due to maternity
leave and child care. In Kunze (2002) negative eﬀects of interruptions are found
for young women in Germany. The eﬀect of interruptions due to maternity leave
are greater than for interruptions due to unemployment.
A second hypothesis explains the child penalty by heterogeneity among women.
The underlying idea is that women have diﬀerent abilities, which are often unob-
served, or diﬀering productivity and these characteristics may be correlated with
fertility. In Lundberg and Rose (2000), they find that, prior to their first birth
mothers earn nine percent less than women who remain childless. To deal with
this aspect most of the studies apply a fixed eﬀects estimator in order to remove
unobserved characteristics like taste and ability.
The choice of sector or type of job has also been suggested as a possible deter-
minant of the child penalty. If women with children choose to work in sectors
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or types of job that are, in general, characterised by lower payment, yet perhaps
also by a more family friendly working environment, this will lead to a child
penalty. In Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999) the child penalty is examined for
two cohorts of British women. Their results show that mothers have lower wages
than childless women. By using the Oaxaca decomposition they find that part
of the family gap can be attributed to part time employment. Yet, even among
full time employed women there is evidence of a child penalty. The issue of the
choice of sector has been examined by Nielsen et al.(2001). They examine the
wage eﬀects of career interruptions in a model where the choice of the private
versus the public sector is endogenous. By using data on Danish women, they
find small wage eﬀects in the public sector while there are no eﬀects in the private
sector.
In a recent study of Anderson et al. (2002) the three hypotheses mentioned above
are considered empirically using panel data for the US. They find that the child
penalty varies across education groups. Furthermore, they show that part of the
child wage penalty can be explained by diﬀerences in human capital variables
such as diﬀerences in labour market experience, interruptions to labour market
career and choice of sector and occupation. These variables account for about
30-60 percent of the diﬀerences, while the remaining part is unexplained. Hence,
the unexplained child penalty is estimated to range between 0 to 8 percent.
A closely related explanation is that job-mobility of mothers is relatively low. If
mothers are less likely to search for new jobs because of high search costs, for
example, they may remain in jobs that are a bad match and only slowly improve
the quality of their job match. This leads to lower earnings compared to similar
childless women. Since the fertility period often clashes with the early career,
the loss due to motherhood might depend on the timing of childbirth in relation
to the labour market career. However, Waldfogel (1998) and Phipps, Burton
6
and Lethbridge (2001) find that returning to the same employer after maternity
leave actually has a positive eﬀect on wages, but this might be because staying
with the same employer actually acts as a kind of insurance against income loss.
Furthermore, Waldfogel (1998) finds that the size of wage loss due to taking
maternity leave depends on whether the woman was covered by a maternity leave
scheme.
The fifth hypothesis suggested by Becker (1985) and Hersch and Statton (1997)
to explain the child penalty is that women with children invest less eﬀort and
are, hence, less productive. This hypothesis is investigated by Phipps, Burton
and Lethbrigde (2001) who argue that the more time women spend on housework
and child care, the less energy they have for their labour market careers. By
including numbers of hours spent on unpaid work in the estimation they find that
the child penalty declines, but remains significant. Related to this hypothesis is
the discrimination hypothesis, which suggests that employers pay women with
children less because they think they are less productive.
The final hypothesis that we discuss in this section concerns the fact that fertility
could be endogenous to the wage process. A number of studies have found that
the fertility decision is aﬀected by the previous labour supply and there are also
some which investigate the impact of wages on fertility (see Moﬃtt (1984) and
Heckman and Walker (1990)). In these studies higher levels of wages seem to
have a negative impact on fertility. However, none of these studies examines
whether shocks to the wage process have an impact on the timing of births.6 The
idea is that women who are not promoted or do not succeed in making a good
job match may instead choose to have a child, or that women who are successful
6In Moﬃtt (1984) fertility is assumed to be aﬀected by the female wage only at entrance into
marriage. In Heckman and Walker (1990), individual wages are not used in the estimations,
but instead a age-specific average of female hourly wages is used.
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in their labour market careers might postpone having children or choose not to
have children. Such behaviour would imply that wages start to fall even before
maternity leave.
This paper examines the child penalty by focussing on the forces that drive the
wage movements around the first birth. Our analysis builds on a human capital
model and we will take account of alternative explanations. In the analysis we
explicitly control for duration of interruptions, choice of sector and job mobility.
Furthermore, we allow the wage process to diﬀer between mothers and childless
women. We also explicitly take account of the heterogeneity between women who
remain childless and women who have children, by performing separate analyses
of women who remain childless and women will have children. However, regard-
ing the hypothesis relating to the lower productivity of mothers, we can only
provide indirect evidence, since no measure of productivity is available. The last
hypothesis suggesting that the fertility may be endogenous to the wage process
cannot be examined directly. What we do here, is to examine how much of the
fall in wages before the maternity leave can be attributed to women changing
their behaviour prior to the interruption. An "unexplained" dip in wages can
then be seen as evidence that the fertility is endogenous to the wage process.
3 Institutions and policy changes
The German maternity and parental leave reforms
It has often been claimed that Germany has one of the most generous parental
leave and benefit policies.7 For the period 1975 to 1995, two laws are most rele-
vant for the description of the maternity and parental leave system. These are the
7For an international comparison see Blau and Kahn, 1995.
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maternity protection law (Mutterschutzgesetz) and the federal child-rearing ben-
efit law (Bundererziehungssgeldgesetz). Additionally, the law protecting against
wrongful dismissal (Kündingungsschutzgesetz) applies.
Only since 1979 have employed mothers been eligible for maternity leave and
benefits.8 From 1979 to 1985, only mothers could take leave, while since 1986
fathers have been able to take legally protected leave as well. For fathers, still,
taking parental leave is the rare exception; in 97 percent of all cases it is the
mother who takes parental leave.
The term protected leave implies that the mother has the option to return to a job
comparable to the job held before pregnancy; hence, the employer must hold the
job available until the protected leave expires and cannot fire the worker during
this period. Usually during the first six months of maternity leave, compensation
may be paid in the form of wage and health benefits by the firm and the State.
Afterwards the employer-employee relation is on hold and the employee cannot
make any claims for wage payments.
From 1980 until 1985, regulations were based on the maternity protection law
(“Mutterschutzgesetz”). It contains four main regulations: First, women can-
not be dismissed during pregnancy and until 4 months after delivery. Second,
mothers must not work 6 weeks before and 8 weeks after delivery (the maternity
protection). Third, mothers are entitled to 4 months protected maternity leave
after the maternity protection period. Fourth, mothers are entitled to 6 months
of maternity benefits after childbirth. In 1986 the federal child-rearing benefit
law (“Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz”) took eﬀect replacing the concept of mater-
nity leave with the concept of parental leave. Durations of maternity or parental
leave, are summarised in Table 1.
8For comparison, in the U.S. the Family and Medical leave Act of 1993 was introduced much
later.
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[table 1]
Several key policy changes during the 1980s and up to the mid 1990s can be
summarised in three points: First, in 1986 the switch from a pure maternity
leave system to a parental leave system took place. Additionally, non-working
parents became eligible to receive benefits as well. Second, in 1991 protected
leave was extended to three years. Third, maternity and parental leave benefits
changed with respect to the duration.
Until 1986, in order to be eligible for maternity benefits mothers had to be em-
ployed (and not self employed). Since 1986, all mothers and fathers can claim
benefits; including unemployed and not working parents.
In the federal child-rearing benefit law, as well as in subsequent amendments to
the law, the period of protected leave was sequentially extended as was the period
of entitlement to benefits. They are listed in Table 1. For instance, from 1986
to 1988 the parental leave was extended to 8 months, and entitlement to benefits
to 10 months, which includes two months of maternity leave. However, eligibility
for the full duration of benefits based on the child-rearing benefit law is means
tested.
These policy changes are particularly useful for identification of wage eﬀects,
since it is obvious that they aﬀect the duration of maternity leave. One could
speculate whether these changes in the maternity leave system also aﬀected the
wages of women, since it may add an extra cost on the employer. However,
studies of the gender gap in Germany show that the mean gender gap is stable
over the period indicating that women wages were not aﬀected. Furthermore,
the changes in the law apply to children born after a certain date in the near
future. Hence, given the imperfect expectation about having children, one may
claim that individuals will not change their behaviour regarding having children
10
because of an expected extended parental leave. Although parents can change
the duration of the parental leave in the range of the maximum leave granted by
law at the time of birth of their children, they cannot take direct advantage of
the policy change.9
4 The data
To study wage movements around child birth we use the regional file of the IAB
employment sample (IABS)10 for West Germany for the period 1975 to 1997.11
The IABS is a 1 percent random sample drawn from the event history data file
of the social security insurance scheme, the employment statistics, collected by
the German Federal Bureau of Labour. The fact that the data was collected for
administrative purposes is an obvious advantage and makes the data particularly
reliable. The IABS contains all workers in West Germany who have had at least
one employment spell that is covered by the social security insurance scheme. As
a result, all dependent employees in the private sector are included, i.e. about 80
percent of total employment in West Germany. Not included are: civil servants,
self-employed, unpaid family workers and people who are not eligible for benefits
from the social security system.12
The data, however, is not without limitations. The main shortcomings, which
are due to the lack of information about hours of work, will be compensated
by focusing on full time workers.13 Furthermore, we use supplementary survey
9However, one may argue that they can plan to have a second, further, child due to the
improved legal framework. We cannot take this into consideration given our data.
10IABS in abbreviation for the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Sample.
11We use only wages from the period 1980-1995
12For more details see Bender et. al. (1996).
13Full-time is defined as 35 hours per week in the IABS. We keep records of full-time workers
until their first part-time job in our sample.
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data in order to analyse variations in hours of work. Another caveat of the wage
data in the IABS is the lack of information about income components. We show
with data from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) that this is another
interesting aspect to the analysis of family gap.
A unit of observation in the IABS is a spell reported for every change related to
the working and non-working status. An individual record may therefore contain
multiple spells sorted by calendar dates within a year. An employment spell is
defined as the period the employee holds a particular position in a particular
firm. If the employee changes positions within the firm or changes firm, the
employment spell ends and a new starts. For each spell, characteristics of the
job, firm, occupation and the average daily wage over the spell are reported.
Moreover, the firm has to report this information by 1 January each year, which
means that all spells are ended at the end of the year. If the employee is still
employed in the same job at the beginning of the year, a new employment spell
starts. This implies that an employment spell cannot exceed one year.
Furthermore, in the data non-working status is distinguished into interruptions
and unemployment. Interruptions indicate that the employer-employee relation-
ship is on hold, yet the contract is still valid. In this case no wage payments are
made. These interruptions are used to identify maternity leave for women.1415
Unemployment is reported in cases where unemployment insurance or unemploy-
ment assistance is received. Every other status that does not fall in either of
these categories results in a gap in the individual’s record, and will be counted in
14More generally, interruptions may be reported if a worker is absent for a longer period due
to health problems, for example. We assume that this does not apply in a significant number
number of cases for childbearing age women.
15The IABS does contain some information on number of children. However, the quality of
the variable is very poor for women, as it has also been admitted by the data producer. Hence,
we refrain from using this variable.
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this study as not working.
The sample selection.
From the IABS we generate a sample of young female workers whose post-
schooling work history is observed from the beginning. We distinguish between
three skill levels: Unskilled workers, skilled workers and graduates. Unskilled
workers are defined as those with 9 or 10 years of compulsory schooling16 and
having no additional training at all, or having shorter education, that is less than
2 years of vocational training or college. Skilled workers are defined as those who
have undertaken vocational training within the German dual system apprentice-
ship programme and 10 years of schooling (intermediate schooling degree). This
is a vocational training programme that combines school and work-based edu-
cational programmes. This has been the main route into the labour market in
Germany, in particular, since the 1970’s. 60-70 percent of all workers fall into this
category. Graduates are those with 12 or 13 years of schooling and who achieved
a technical college degree, 3 to 4 years, or a university degree, 4 to 6 years.
In this paper, we focus in the estimation on maternity leave in association with
first birth. Therefore, our main sample consists of women for whom we observe
an interruption due to maternity leave. More particularly, we only include women
who give birth to their first child after labour market entry in our sample period.
For these women we include wage spells before and after first birth, but observa-
tions after the second birth, if observed, are eliminated. Hence, we exclude eﬀects
of second, and further births.
In order to evaluate the results further, we borrow from the program evaluation
literature. For that we define a comparison sample consisting of females who have
16Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish in the data whether individuals graduate after 9 or
10 years of schooling from the Hauptschule or Realschule.
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no children. This sample is further restricted such that only women who where
observed that they are childless by age 35 are included.17
The variables
In order to generate complete work histories we assume that graduates are not
older than 23 in 1975, and everybody else is not older than 16 in 1975. We
generate the variable age at entry into first employment in order to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in schooling. Wages in the IABS are reported on a daily
basis and are highly reliable given that they are checked by both data collectors
and employees. They are topcoded, as is the case with most administrative data.
However, wages in our sample are virtually unaﬀected by the topcoding; for
graduates we find that only 4.5 percent of wages are topcoded. For unskilled and
skilled, only 0.2 percent of the wages are topcoded.
As a result of the sample design in this study we observe complete work histories
in the data that allow us to observe the accumulation process of human capital as
well as wages from the beginning. In our analyses, the main variables are the log of
wages, and the work history variables, work experience, and, the interruption due
to birth of the first child.18 In fact we count the total length of the interruption
including parental leave and related to the birth of the first child. This increases
the variation in our interruption variable compared to the parental leave duration
stated by law.
17We acknowledge that some of these women may have children later than 35.
18For a complete list of the variables see Appendix A2.
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4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows summary statistics for our sample separately by education group.19
The first four columns refer to our main sample, namely those women for whom
we observe the first birth. The last column refers to the comparison group, which
is defined as women who do not have children by the age of 35. For our main
sample we distinguish between the wage spells before the first birth (column 1)
and after the first birth (column 4). In particular, we focus on the last spell
before birth (column 2) and the first spell after first birth (column 3). The table
shows that unskilled women have their first child around age 24, while the age is
25 for skilled and 29 for graduates. The table also shows that, on average,
unskilled and skilled have between 4 and 5 years of experience before the inter-
ruption, while the graduates have a bit less, around 3.75 years. Turning to the
third and fourth columns the numbers refer to wage spells after first birth. First,
the number of individuals suggests that not all women return to full time work
after giving birth. From the statistics on the total time out, we find that the
duration of the interruption is around one and a half to two and a half years for
all education groups. The table also confirms a drop in wages around the first
birth for all education groups.
[table 2]
The last column reports summary statistics for the control group. From the
last column it is seen that the control group is older for all education groups,
which is due to how the group is defined. The control group has more experience
and less time out of work. To examine whether the group of women who remain
19The distribution on education groups shows that graduates seem to be underrepresented.
The reason for this is that civil servants are not included in the sample.
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childless have diﬀerent unobserved characteristics than women who have children,
we compare their entry wages. The entry wages clearly show that the entry wages
for women who remain childless are much higher than for women who later will
have children. This finding confirms the result of Lundberg and Rose (2000).
To analyse the direct impact of the interruption due to maternity leave we com-
pare wages in the last spell before the interruption due to maternity leave and
wages in the first spell after the interruption. Since not all women in our sample
return to full time work after giving birth, we start by providing more summary
statistics for women who return to work.
4.1.1 Return to work
In figure 2 the average probability of return to full time work is shown for the
sample period. The lowest line in the figure shows the probability of returning
to full time employment after less than one year interruption in connection with
parental leave. The middle line refers to the probability of returning to full time
employment within two years after the birth and the upper line refers to the
probability of returning within three years. The figure shows that the probability
of return within three years after the interruption was about 70 percent in the
beginning of the 1980s and had declined to about 50 percent at the beginning
of the 1990s. The graph also shows that until the mid 1980s more than half of
women who do return do so within the first year after the interruption and only
very few return between the second and the third years after the interruption.
Moreover, the figure also shows that the major reforms of the maternity leave
system in 1986 and 1991 were associated with a decrease in the probability that
a woman returns to full time employment within three years.
[Figure 2]
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In table 3 we compare characteristics of women who do not return to the labour
force within three years to those who return to part time and those who return
to full time. All summary statistics refer to the last spell before the interruption.
The last column shows that for unskilled workers, 67.1 percent return to full time
work, whereas 56.9 percent of the skilled and 60.2 percent of the graduates return.
For all education groups, around 20 percent do not return within three years. In
general, those who do not return have less experience and had a lower wage
compared to those who return to either part or full time work. Those who return
to part time work are, in general, older, have more experience and earn higher
wages prior to the birth, compared to those who remain in full time employment
before and after birth.
[table 3]
4.1.2 The drop
For those women who return to work we can compare wages in the last spell
before the interruption with wages in the first spell after the child birth. It turns
out that more than 50 percent receive a lower wage when they return to work.
The average loss in wages is reported in Table 4. In the first column we report
the average loss for all workers. We mainly focus of those who return to full time
work, but for comparison we also report the loss for both those returning to part
time and full time work. The loss (in real terms) for those who return to full time
work is 9.7 percent for unskilled workers, 24.3 percent for skilled workers and 16.9
percent for graduates. The numbers show clearly that unskilled workers have a
substantially smaller loss than the other groups. Given this big loss, we also
compute the losses in nominal terms. The findings reveal similarly considerable
decreases in nominal wages (7.4 percent for unskilled, 21.9 percent for skilled and
17
14.9 percent for graduates). If we only consider those women returning to the
same firm after the interruption, the loss is even bigger for skilled workers and
graduates. The last column refers to women who return to the same firm and
the same occupation. For these women we think that they are likely to return to
exactly the same job that they left for maternity leave. However, the loss is still
of the same size.
[table 4]
Reduction in working hours
Since we compare daily wages the drop may partly be due to a reduction in
working hours. However, we are only considering full time employment which
means that these women worked at least 35 hours per week both before and after
the interruption. Unfortunately we do not have access to information about the
numbers of working hours in the IABS sample, so it is diﬃcult to tell exactly how
much a reduction in hours contributes to the loss.
[table 5]
In order to provide more information about the big wage loss, we exploit alter-
native data sources. Using survey data20 we obtain additional information about
the number of working hours in the West German states. In this data set both
the oﬃcial and the actual working hours are stated for 1995. We select a sample
of women aged 20-39 who all report that they work full time (the oﬃcial working
20The survey data were collected by the IAB, Nürnberg and distributed by the Central
Archive Unit in Cologne (Zentralarchiv):Erwerbswünsche und Erwerbsverhalten von Frauen in
Ost und Westdeutschland, 1995 (in English: Desired Work and Working Behaviour of Women
in East and West Germany in 1995)
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hours are at least 35 hours per week). Then, we compare the actual working
hours of those who have children with those without children. On average, the
sample without children work 40.1 hours per week,21 while those with children
work 39.1 hours per week.22 Although women without children work one hour
more per week, this can only explain a decrease of 2.5 percent in daily wages. This
suggests that only a small part of the wage loss is due to a reduction in work-
ing hours. Similar evidence is found using the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) data. From the GSOEP we selected a sample of women aged 20-39,
for whom the birth of their first child is within the sample period. Furthermore,
we limit the sample to women who report that their oﬃcial working hours are
above 35 hours both before and after the birth.23 The advantage of the GSOEP
is that we can follow the same women, this means that we can also investigate
whether the dip in wages prior to the interruption is due to a reduction in hours
(caused by the pregnancy). Table 5 provides the actual and oﬃcial working hours
for those women one and two years prior to the birth and the first year after they
return to work. The table shows no changes in actual working hours around the
first birth, which indicates that the wage movement around the first birth is not
driven by changes in working hours.
Bonus payment
To further investigate the big drop in wages around first birth we try to decompose
the labour income. In Germany it is common that part of labour income is
paid in diﬀerent bonus schemes (e.g. 13 month payments, Christmas payments,
Holiday payments). In the IABS we cannot decompose labour income into regular
salary and bonus payments. Therefore, we complement the IABS data with data
from GSOEP which contains detailed information about regular salary and bonus
21This number is the average number of working hours based on 480 childless women.
22This number is the average number of working hours based on 332 women with children.
23More details about the data are provided in appendix A3.
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payments.
Again we focus on a subsample of women aged 20-39. In order to decompose
labour income we focus entirely on those women who have been employed full
time for the whole year. For these women we find that bonus payments amount
to about 4 percent of the total labour income.
[table 6]
Table 6 shows the labour income for women with and without children. From the
table it is seen that women with children earn about 10 percent less than women
without children. However, from the table we can see as well that the decrease in
labour income is not equally distributed between regular salary and bonus pay-
ment. While the regular salary is about 9 percent lower for women with infants,
their bonus payments are 25 percent lower (a more detailed analysis of the earned
income is shown in appendix A3). For women with older children the diﬀerences
between bonus payments and regular payments is even more pronounced.24
The figures in the table indicate that part of the drop in wages around the first
birth is due to a substantial decrease in bonus payments. However, this cannot
explain the entire drop in wages. Additional explanations for the drop could
be that firms illegally pay mothers less when they return after maternity leave.
Nevertheless, since very few cases of women going to court are known to us for
Germany it is diﬃcult to tell the importance of this discriminatory behaviour.
What seems to be a likely explanation is that women may change working sched-
ule, such that before maternity leave their working schedule included evenings,
nights and weekends whereas afterwards they work more during regular working
hours. Hence, they may lose extra pay for work during irregular hours.
24For women with children aged 2 and above the regular salary is about 7 percent lower than
childless women, while the bonus payments are 30 percent lower.
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5 The econometric framework
In this section we specify a statistical framework to summarise the evidence on
earnings growth and earnings losses around first birth. This specification is in-
tended to estimate short and long run wage eﬀects preceding first birth as well
as after returning to work.
The wage equation presented in this paper is based on the classical human capital
model (see Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974)). Wages are determined by a simple
model:
lnwit = xitβ + it (1)
where
it = νi + uit. (2)
We regress the logarithmic wage on a set of controls, xit, including human capital
variables such as experience, but variables that measure depreciation of human
capital are also included. The subscript i indicates the individual and t refers to
the employment spell. The error term includes an individual specific component
that captures unobserved individual specific characteristics, such as ability or mo-
tivation, an individual specific component that may vary over time and measures
the quality of a worker firm match that is assumed to have zero mean.
In order to describe wage growth we transform equation (1) into first diﬀerences.
∆lnwit = ∆xitβ +∆it (3)
where
∆it = ∆uit. (4)
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This leads to the elimination of all individual specific observed and unobserved
components. In the empirical analysis we will focus entirely on the growth equa-
tion.
The specification
For the empirical implementation, we specify wage growth equations where we
allow for diﬀerent eﬀects of the controls in each of the three diﬀerent phases: the
pre-birth phase, the intermediate phase and the after birth phase. This is done
by constructing three sets of variables denoted pre birth, interruption and after
birth. These variables are constructed such that
∆xPit =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∆xit if t prior to first birth
0 otherwise
,
∆xIit =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∆xit if t− 1 prior to first birth and t is after first birth
0 otherwise
∆xAit =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∆xit if t− 1 after first birth
0 otherwise
.
Furthermore, we include some variables that are specific for each phase. For the
pre birth phase, in line with Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), we allow
wages to decline even before the interruption, by including dummy variables.25
We specify a dummy variable for the three years period prior to first birth in order
to capture the dip: PBit.26 Moreover, we allow the impact of some of the controls
to be diﬀerent in the period three years prior to child birth. In the interruption
phase, the duration of the interruption, Mit, is included as a regressor. Finally,
we include time dummies, Dit, and dummies for industries Fit
∆ lnwit = ∆xPitγ
P +∆xIitγ
I +∆xAitγ
A + PBitα0 + PBit ∗∆xPitα1 (5)
25Diﬀerent specifications have been tried but the dip seems to start around three years before
the interruption.
26We have also tried more general specifications but this seems to capture the eﬀect.
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+Mitτ +∆Ditδ +∆Fitβ +∆uit.
Although we start out with this general specification we will in the final specifi-
cation restrict some of the controls to have the same impact in each phase.
The key parameters of interest in equation (5) are the return to work experience
and the eﬀect of interruption in connection with child birth and unemployment.
From human capital theory, it follows that the coeﬃcient on the experience vari-
able should be positive, capturing returns to investment. If human capital depre-
ciates while not working on the job,27 then an interruption following the birth of
the child may induce a drop in wages and we expect wage growth to be negatively
aﬀected by the duration of parental leave. The same eﬀect should also be found
for unemployment spells. In this specification, we exclude tenure from the equa-
tion assuming that only general human capital acquisition aﬀects wages. This
has the advantage of reducing the potential number of endogenous variables.
Furthermore, mismatching may play a role in the determination of an individual’s
wages. Since we estimate the wage formation in the beginning of the labour
market careers of young women, we expect these women to improve their match
by changing firms. Therefore, we model wage growth to be aﬀected by occupation
or firm changes. We include dummies for this type of behaviour. Furthermore, in
the application, changing occupation or firm can have a diﬀerent impact if it is
immediately before an interruption. The reason for doing this is because one of
the explanations for the family gap is that women choose jobs or firms which pay
less but are more family friendly. In order to investigate whether women actually
start choosing these jobs prior to the interruption, we consider that changing job
or firm could have a negative impact on the wage process.
When estimating the wage equation there are two well-known problems: the en-
27Mincer and Polachek (1974).
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dogeneity of the experience and interruption variables and the sample selection
problem. Both problems arise because labour supply is likely to be endogenous
to the wage process. This implies that the error term in equation (3) is likely
to be correlated with the variables of interest; in particular, the experience vari-
able and the interruption variables (for unemployment and maternity leave).28
A commonly used approach in this type of model is the instrumental variable
estimation. We deal with these two issues by applying a two step method de-
scribed in Wooldridge (2002). In the first step we correct for the sample selection
bias by using the inverse mill’s ratio, and in the second step instruments for the
endogenous variables have been applied.
Instruments:
The richness of the IABS data provides us with a number of suitable instruments
for labour supply. First, we use lagged levels of the work experience variable, the
work experience variable squared and unemployment as instruments, assuming
that E[xt−s|(∆uit)] = 0, where s > 1.29 Furthermore, we use age at entry into
labour market, age and first diﬀerences in potential experience. Moreover, since
we estimate wage equations for mothers, we use instruments particularly related
to the labour force participation of mothers. That is we use information about the
parental leave period. In the sample period there have been a number of changes
in the parental leave system which provide us with an excellent instrument.30 As
can be seen in figure 2, the duration of observed leave is highly correlated with
the oﬃcial maximum duration of parental leave. We also use the availability of
child care facilities in the region as an instrument for the duration of interruption
associated with maternity leave. As an additional instrument for unemployment
28If it depends only on individual-specific eﬀects, estimation of the first diﬀerence equation
is not aﬀected.
29see Arellano and Bond (1991).
30See the discussion of the instrument in section 3.
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we use the regional unemployment rate. Furthermore for the after birth phase
we also use the age of the child as an instrument.31 Other studies have pointed
out the problem of weak instruments. By allowing the instruments to vary across
these three phases we can exploit the instruments more eﬃciently. For a detailed
description of the instruments see appendix A4.
6 Estimation Results
In this section we discuss the estimation results obtained from the specification
discussed above. We estimate the model for a sample of women who all give
birth and on a sample of women who remain childless. The sample used for the
estimations is a trimmed version of the data described in the data section.32
6.1 Estimation for women who give birth
In table 7 the estimates of the three phase model are shown. For comparison we
have also estimated a model where we only correct for the sample selection bias
and the estimates are reported in the first three columns.
The remaining three columns in table 7 refer to the IV-First Diﬀerence corrected
for sample selection bias estimation. Moving from the FD estimate to the IV
approach has the expected implications of the estimates: the losses due to inter-
ruptions are increasing and the return to experience is mainly declining. In the
following we will concentrate on the IV-FD estimates.
[Table 7]
31Dummy variables for child aged 0-3, 4-6 and 7 to 10 are used.
32We have eliminated all observations where |∆ lnw| > 1.
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The pre-birth phase (the dip)
The estimated return to experience is positive, but decreasing in the level of
experience. The return from increasing the level of experience from three to four
years33 is 4.0 percent for unskilled, 4.5 percent for skilled and 4.5 percent for
graduate. Our estimates of the return to experience are in line with what others
have found.34
In this phase we estimate the impact of an interruption due to unemployment.
The estimates indicate that for skilled and graduate women, unemployment does
not have a significant impact on the wage formation. For unskilled workers we
find the opposite. Spells of unemployment seem to have a strong negative and
significant impact on their wages. The estimate suggests that unskilled women
lose around 24.7 percent from one year of unemployment.35
In the estimation we have included a dummy variable for the three years prior to
the interruption. This variable is not negatively significant for any of the groups,
suggesting that there is no ”unexplained dip” in the wage process prior to birth.36
However, for the skilled group we find that those changing occupations within
three years before giving birth experience a negative eﬀect of about 0.8 percent,
whereas, changing occupations, in general, has a positive impact on wages.37 An
explanation for this is that prior to giving birth, women choose jobs that pay less
but instead oﬀer a family friendly work environment. We do not find any negative
eﬀect of changing firms prior to the interruption for any of the three groups, and
33For this sample, the average level of experience for all education groups is between two and
3.3 years.
34For comparison, Dustmann and Meghir (2002) find that the return to experience for young
male Germans with completed apprenticeship starts from about 7 percent and drop to 1.5
percent within four years.
35The eﬀect of unemploymenet is rather unprecisely determined.
36In fact there is a small positive eﬀect for skilled women.
37The eﬀect is calculated as the general eﬀect from changing occupation 2.7-3.5=-0.8
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graduates seem actually to benefit from changing firms prior to birth.
The Interruption (the drop)
In the specification used the wage eﬀects of an interruption are determined by
the duration of the interruption and whether the women change firms or occu-
pations in connection with the interruption. In the present specification the loss
is determined by the duration of the interruption.38 The estimates indicate that
wages are declining around the first birth for all three groups, but the size of
the decline varies. For unskilled women and graduates, the loss associated with
a one year interruption is 3.4 percent and 3.9 percent, while for skilled women
the loss is about 14.7 percent. Moreover, the estimation results also show that
especially for unskilled women changing firm in connection with child birth has
a strong negative eﬀect on wages. A similar result was found for the US (see
Waldfogel (1998)) and for Canada (see Phipps, Burton and Lethbridge (2001)).
This suggests that staying with the same employer may act as a kind of insurance
against income loss of unskilled mothers, while it does not have the same impact
for skilled or graduate mothers.
The post birth phase (the recovery)
To illustrate the return to experience after giving birth, we calculated the return
to experience from increasing the level from three to four years of experience: the
return is 4.7 percent for unskilled women, 6.8 percent for skilled women and 5.4
percent for graduates. A formal test for having the same return to experience
before and after birth is rejected for unskilled and skilled but not for graduates.
The estimated return to experience after giving birth is higher than before giving
birth for all groups.39 This means that we find evidence for a rebound eﬀect
38Diﬀerent specifications of the duration have been tried, but the estimated loss associated
with one year interruption is very robust across diﬀerent specifications.
39This result holds for all plausible values of experiences.
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especially for skilled women, although the rebound eﬀect is small. In figure 3 we
illustrate the rebound eﬀect, by showing the predicted wages for three women
entering the labour market at age 19 and work full time until age 30 except for
one year of parental leave. We assume that one woman gives birth at 21, one at
25 and the last at 30. The figure shows that the rebound eﬀect is stronger for
those giving birth earlier.
[figure 3]
Moreover, we also find that the loss due to an interruption of unemployment has
strong negative implications for the wages of mothers. For skilled mothers this is
in contrast to the pre birth phase where no significant eﬀects of unemployment
were found.40 If we compare the decline in wages of an interruption due to child
birth with an interruption due to unemployment (after giving birth), we find that
for all three groups, the loss is bigger for an interruption due to unemployment.
The estimates of the inverse mill’s ratio are negative for all education groups,
indicating negative selection. An explanation for this finding could be that it is
mainly mothers who have to work for financial reasons who return to full time
employment.
Furthermore, we find that changing firms or occupations has a positive impact on
wage growth for all three education groups, although the eﬀects are insignificant
for graduates. This result is in accordance with the idea that early in the career
workers improve their match by changing firm.
To sum up, we recover three wage eﬀects around first birth, although they seem
to arise in distinctive ways for the diﬀerent education groups. First, we find that
the entire dip in wages prior to the child birth can be attributed to changes in
40We cannot exclude the possibility that the diﬀerent impact of unemployment before and
after birth is caused by diﬀerences in age.
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labour market career characteristics of the women or the job, in particular chang-
ing occupations prior to birth seems to explain the dip for skilled women. Second,
the drop around first birth arises for unskilled women primarily if they change
occupations or firms in connection with child birth, while for skilled women the
drop is almost entirely associated with the duration of the interruption. Further-
more, our estimation results confirm that skilled women are those who suﬀer from
the greatest wage cut due to child birth. The third wage eﬀect is associated with
the recovery phase. For all three education groups we do find signs of recovery
although the rebound eﬀect is small. Moreover, for skilled women and graduates
the damaging eﬀect of unemployment is stronger in the post birth period than in
the pre birth period.
Furthermore, what we find is that the impact of an interruption on the labour
market careers depends of the duration of the interruption. This provides evi-
dence for the hypothesis concerning human capital depreciation (see Mincer and
Polachek (1974)). However, the fact that we also find that the cause and the
timing of the interruption has an impact on the size of the decline in wages sug-
gests that the hypothesis on human capital depreciation can only partly explain
the findings. Our findings are in accordance with the findings of Albrecht et al.
(1999), who find that interruptions of unemployment are more damaging than
interruptions due to maternity leave.
6.2 The comparison sample
In order to evaluate whether women with and without children face diﬀerent wage
processes, in this section we present a comparison between the two groups.
We define the comparison group as women who remain childless until the age
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of 35.41 We find that the group who remains childless has higher entry wages;
unskilled women who remain childless earn on average 20 percent more than
women who later have children. For skilled workers the diﬀerence is 25 percent
and for graduates 19 percent (see table 2). This suggests that even before the
interruption, groups diﬀer.42 This provides evidence for the hypothesis that part
of the family gap is due to heterogeneity.
Comparison between women with and without children
Before turning to the estimation of the wage equation for the comparison group we
compare simple means of wages. To make the comparison we use matching based
on the propensity score method.43 We have selected a sample of skilled women
who have their first child at the age of 25 and return to full time employment
after an interruption of less than a year. Using the propensity score method we
select out of the comparison group a sample of skilled women who are comparable
in terms of work experience, unemployment, number of jobs, number of firms and
industries for each age. The mean wages of the two groups are shown in figure
4. The figure shows that there are only small diﬀerences in the wages of the
comparison group and the pre birth group up to the age 24. At age 25, the year
they give birth, wages are lower than for the comparison group. Furthermore,
it is seen that the large diﬀerence in wages between the comparison group and
the group of women giving birth at age 25 cannot be explained by diﬀerences in
observables.
41As mentioned earlier, we cannot exclude the possibility that women in this sample give
birth later than 1995 when the observation window ends.
42A similar result is found for the US. Lundberg and Rose (2000) found the diﬀerence to be
nine percent.
43In this exercise we do not attempt to estimate a "treatment" eﬀect, because it is unlikely
that the conditional indepencence assumption is fulfilled in our context. This is only done to
show the diﬀerences between the two groups, when controlling for observable characteristics.
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[figure 4]
Estimation results
To examine how wages develop we estimate a wage equation. The wage equation
is the same as the previous one, with the exception that all the variables relating
to the birth of a child are left out. The instruments applied for this sample are
the same as for the first sample except for instruments directly related to labour
supply of mothers. The estimations results in Table 8 show that the return to
experience is positive and decreasing in the level of experience. The return to
experience for childless women is lower than the return of mothers.
[table 8]
In table 7 and 8, if we compare the loss due to spells of unemployment, we find
that for unskilled women, women who remain childless have the greatest loss due
to unemployment.44 For skilled and graduate women who remain childless the
loss due to unemployment is larger than for mothers prior to birth, but smaller
than the post birth period. Another diﬀerence between the childless women and
women who have children is that the gain from changing firms is larger for the
childless women. Finally, in this sample we find that the parameter of the inverse
mill’s ratio is small and insignificant for all education groups.
One of the striking results from this comparison suggests that women who remain
childless have a very diﬀerent wage process than childless women who are going
to have children. Although figure 4 did not show much diﬀerence in the levels for
women aged around 20-24,45 the estimation results show four major diﬀerences.
44For unskilled women, who are having children the loss due to unemployment is not changing
before and after giving birth.
45The main reason why we did not find large diﬀerences is because the sample of women
giving birth is highly selected in the sense that it is only those who return to full time work
within one year.
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First, the wages of women who become mothers increase faster due to work
experience and second, spells of unemployment have a less servere impact on
wages, except for unskilled workers. These two eﬀects are oﬀset by the fact that
women who remain childless have higher entry wages and that they are more
likely to change firms, and the impact of changing firms is larger which results in
an increase in wages.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate wage eﬀects for women in West Germany around
first birth using data for the period 1975-1995. Simple descriptives on wages for
a sample of women in their 20s up to 39 reveal that shortly before giving birth,
a dip in the wage profile is observed. On return to work, that is after exiting for
an extended parental leave period, wages drop further by approximately 10 to 20
percent. The goal of our analysis is to shed light upon what explains these eﬀects.
More particularly, we want to identify factors that cause this big drop. We set
up a simple wage regression framework. The key parameters of interest are the
return to work experience and the eﬀect of the interruption itself. In addition to
IV estimation results from wage growth equations, we present estimates of the
wage process using a sample of women who remain childless.
The main results from our analyses are that the dip is in fact quite small, yet the
drop in wages after return to work remains substantial. The eﬀects diﬀer in size
as well as in terms of the driving factors across the educational distribution. The
dip can be entirely contributed to changes in other controls. For skilled women,
we find only a dip associated with occupation changes which may mean that
workers change to diﬀerent careers, perhaps oﬀering more non-pecuniary utility,
which is unobserved by our data.
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For the drop, again, we find that the wage movement arises diﬀerently for diﬀer-
ent educational groups. For unskilled women, a considerable part of the loss is
associated with firm mobility, while for skilled women the loss is mainly deter-
mined by the duration of maternity leave. The drop is not significant in the upper
part of the educational distribution. A possible explanation for the diﬀerences
between education groups is that for the unskilled, the way to keep high human
capital and high wages, is to remain with the firm. This eﬀect is less important
for skilled women and graduates since they have higher stocks of general human
capital. This indicates that unskilled women, in particular, are protected by the
German parental leave scheme against wage cuts since it guarantees that they
can return to the same firm and the same job. For all education groups we find
a rebound eﬀect, although it is small.
Comparison of entry wages and wage profiles for our sample of women before and
after first birth with women who remain childless reveals that unobserved hetero-
geneity accounts for a large extent of the diﬀerences in wages as well as mobility.
While future mothers profit most from relatively high returns to experience and
have high levels of job stability, childless women would do more job shopping and
gain more through improvement in their job matches.
How women’s wages are aﬀected by child birth has an impact on a number of
issues concerning women’s labour market behaviour. These results are to our
knowledge the first results that examine in detail the wage movements around
first birth as well as the causal factors that drive wage profiles of women with
children and childless women.
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A Appendix
A.1 Empirical studies of the family gap
Table A1.1: Empirical studies of the family gap
Study Waldfogel, 1998 Joshi, Paci and Phipps, Burton and Anderson, Binder
Waldfogel, 1999 Lethbridge, 2001 and Krause 2002
Data Panel Cross sections Cross sections with Panel data
retrospective information
Country US US and UK Canada US
Dep. variable log wage log wage log income log wage
Est. of family gap Children Children Interruptions/children Children
Explanatory. var. Exp., edu, race Exp., edu., parttime Exp., parttime, Exp, edu., occup.,
parental social status housework, married parttime,
interruption time out
Estimation method Fixed eﬀect/ Heckman and OLS OLS OLS/Fixed eﬀect
First diﬀerences
Study Albrecht, Edin, Sundström Datta Gupta and Smith Nielsen Simonsen,
and Vroman, 1999 2002 and Verner, 2001
Data Cross sections and Panel data Panel data
Panel data
Country Sweden Denmark Denmark
Dep. variable log wage log wage log wage
Est. of family gap interruptions Children
Explanatory var. Exp., edu,married,time out Exp, edu,married, exp, educ, sector
unempl.. region
Estimation method OLS/Fixed eﬀect Random or Fixed eﬀect and Endogenous selection of
Heckman’s selection model public/private sector
In table A1.1 the studies examining the family gap have been summarised. These
studies provide measures of the family gap. In all studies a wage equation is
estimated, except in Phipps, Burton and Lethbridge, 2001, where an equation
for income was estimated. The data used in these studies are either panel data
or cross sections data and therefore the estimation methods also vary. However,
only two studies deal with the sample selection bias arising from the fact that
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wages are only observed for individuals working. Furthermore, studies diﬀer in
their approach to estimate the family gap. While in some of the studies the family
gap is measured by estimating the impact of children, others estimate the impact
of an interruption due to maternity leave.
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A.2 Data Appendix
A.2.1: List of variables
Variable Name Definition Construction
IABS sample/Main variables
wage daily wage income during a spell
(max. 1 year) divided by
number of days of work
(incl. weekends)
age age year minus year of birth
education education level at entry
into work
constructed from BILD
variable
education group unskilled/low skilled,
skilled, graduates mea-
sured at entry into
work
Skilled=with 450 days
of apprenticeship,
graduates=tech. col-
lege/university
firm change 1=firm stayer, 0=mover changes in number of
firm variable
occupation changes 1=occupation stayer,
0=occupation mover
changes in 3-digit occu-
pation variable (Code 0-
117)
work experience years of full time work
experience
accumulated length of
spells (day/month/year)
in employment
unemployment (days of unemploy-
ment)/365
accumulated length of
spells (day/month/year)
in unemployment
Parental Leave Interrup-
tion
days of parental leave in-
terruption
accumulated length of
spells (day/month/year)
in interruption
other interruptions (gaps in individual
records)/365)
summarise residual
group of non-work
total time out of work total non work time
P
=(days of unem-
ployment+ days of
parental leave interrup-
tion+days of gaps in the
record)/365)
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Variable Name Definition Construction
IABS sample/Main variables
Industries 13 aggregated industry
sectors distinguished
(1: agriculture, garden-
ing, energy, mining; 2:
Natural products and
goods production; 3:
investment goods pro-
duction; 4: Consumer
goods production; 5:
Nutrition; 6: Construc-
tion; 7: Building Trade;
8: Trade; 9: Transport
and Communication; 10:
Mainly industry’s ser-
vices; 11: Mainly private
household’s services; 12:
Society related services;
13: Social security; 99:
missing.
WZWG variable
GSOEP 1984-2001
Regular Salary annual regular salary 12*(monthly regular salary)
Bonus Payments annual bonus payment 13th and 14th month
salary, X-mas and Vaca-
tion bonus, profit share,
premium, other bonues
Total Labour Income total labour income Regular income+bonus
payments
A.3 Additional evidence from the GSOEP data
Given that we find the big drop in wages around the first birth we would like
to investigate how much of the drop can be attributed to a decrease in working
hours. To do this we have drawn in information from an alternative data source,
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namely the German Socio-Economic Panel Study GSOEP.46 This data set, which
is a large panel of the German population, contains information about both actual
and oﬃcial working hours. To construct a sample as similar as possible to the
IABS sample we select women aged 20-39 who were living in the former West
Germany.
In the questionnaire actual and oﬃcial working hours are reported for a particular
week. We use this information to select a sub sample of full time workers, as those
who report that their oﬃcial working hours exceeds 35 hours. The actual working
hours for this group is 42 hours per week.
A.3.1 The eﬀect of infants on actual working hours
To investigate the eﬀect of infants on actual working hours, the sample is split
according to whether there is an infant in the household (see table A3.1).
Table A3.1: Impact of children for full time working women
Children in the household
No children Infants (0-1 years old) Children (above 2)
Oﬃcial working hours 39.36 39.26 39.21
Actual working hours 42.14 42.08 42.14
No obs. 1311 219 980
This means that the evidence from GSOEP does not provide any reason to believe
that the big drop in wages around the first birth can be explained by a decrease
in actual working hours.
46We use 17 waves of the GSOEP (1984-2000). We only focus on women living in the former
West Germany.
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A.3.2 Bonus payment
To further investigate the big drop in wages around the first birth we try to
decompose labour income. In Germany it is common that part of labour income
is paid in diﬀerent bonus schemes (e.g. 13 month payments, Christmas payments,
Holiday payments). In the IABS we cannot decompose the labour income into
regular salary and bonus payments. Therefore we complement the IABS data
with data from GSOEP.
In the GSOEP detailed information regular salary and bonus payments are avail-
able. Again we focus on a subsample of women aged 20-39. In order to decompose
labour income we focus entirely on those women who have been employed full
time for the whole year. For these women we find that bonus payments amount
to about 4 percent of total labour income.
Table 6 in the main text shows the labour income for women with and without
children. To complement the table we estimate a fixed eﬀect model. The model
we estimate is given by
yit = α0 + α1childit + α2ageit + µi + εit,
where yit is the salary or bonus payment discounted by the consumer price index
and childit is an indicator of children present in the household.47 Given the
very few births we observed in the data,48 the estimates are not very precisely
determined.49 In table A3.2 the estimation results are reported. What we find is
that the birth of a child lowers both the regular salary and the bonus payments.
On average, the regular annual salary drops by 819 DM (measured in 1995 prices).
47In this fixed eﬀect model the age eﬀect and the year eﬀect is confounded. This means that
the coeﬃcient to age can be interpreted as a year eﬀect.
48We observe only 74 birth where the mother has been working full time before and after the
birth.
49A specification where we distinguish between infants and older children have been tried,
but the results do not change substantially.
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This is about 1.4 percent of the annual salary. For the annual bonus payment
the drop is about 539 DM, which is about 20 percent of the bonus payment.
Table A3.2: Fixed eﬀect estimation
Regular salary Bonus Payment
estimate std err estimate std. err
Presence of children -819 3,144 -539 318
Age -1,148 244 178 25
Constant 93,704 7,356 -2,463 745
No obs. 1549 1549
There are two main findings from the analyses with GSOEP. First, using GSOEP
we find a decrease in wages when a child arrives. The decrease is smaller than in
the IABS, but this may be due to the fact that we cannot control properly for
experience. Furthermore, given the small data set we cannot directly measure
the drop, but can only compare those with children to those without children.
Second, we find that part of the drop in earnings is due to a drop in bonus
payments.
A.4 Description of the instruments
In addition to the standard instruments used for wage equations such as age,
lagged levels of experience and of unemployment, potential experience and re-
gional unemployment rates (see Table A4.1), we use a number of additional in-
struments which are particularly relevant for the labour supply of mothers. These
additional instruments are related to the availability of child care facilities in the
region and the institutional setting for maternity leave.
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Table A4.1: List of instruments
Variable Name Definition Source/Construction
regional unemployment
rates
number of unem-
ployed/labour force
from Labour Oﬃce,
Nürnberg on local labour
oﬃce level (180) merged
on regional level
age at entry into training proxy for schooling be-
tween school and appren-
ticeship training
IABS/constructed from
age at first spell for
skilled
age of child age in years of first child IABS/own construction,
year minus year of begin-
ning of interruption
Parental leave policy
change variable
months of parental leave own construction from
various sources, see Fig.
2
Availability of child care facilities by region
As an additional instrument for female labour supply we use variation in the
availability of child care supply. For this purpose we have collected information
from the German Statistical Oﬃce about the number of places per 1000 children
for three age groups: 0-3 years old, 3-6 years old and 6-10 years old. The first
group corresponds to ’Kinderhort’(childcare), the second group corresponds to
kindergarden age and the third group to elementary school age where after school
care is measured by this variable. We have data for the years 1986, 1990 and 1994
on the state level. In West Germany, there are 10 states excluding Berlin which
cannot be used since it is not distinguished in East and West Berlin in the general
statistics on child care. The 10 states are 1: Schleswig-Holstein, 2: Hamburg, 3:
Lower Saxony, 4: Bremen, 5: North-Rhine Westfalia, 6: Hessen, 7: Rheinland-
Palatinia, 8: Badenwürtenberg, 9: Bavaria, 10: Saarland. The IABS contains a
5 digit regional code and the first two digits corrspond to the state that we use
to merge the information.
As we can see from the raw data (see Table A4.2), variation in child care facilities
is almost negligible across years, yet significant across regions. In order to have
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data for the period corresponding to our IABS sample we assume that child care
supply was the same during 1981-1985 as in 1986, and in 1995 we set values equal
to 1994. For years in between years we assume a linear trend.
Table A4.2: Summary statistics on child care supply
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
places overall 22.56942 31.21044 3.713671 118.7626 N = 30
0- 3 year old between 31.08063 6.157206 108.7595 n = 10
within 8.643351 .7982946 55.43244 T = 3
places overall 770.5613 175.4643 460.015 1082.061 N = 30
3-6 year old between 160.3132 525.0438 1008.291 n = 10
within 82.82414 612.2832 919.0045 T = 3
places overall 59.95359 58.7677 14.1894 211.8449 N = 30
6-10 year old between 57.15524 19.25649 201.6663 n = 10
within 20.30299 -26.57971 109.4137 T = 3
Source: German Statistical Oﬃce. See text for more details.
B Appendix: Tables and Figures
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Table 1: German maternity/parental leave policy, 1968-2001
children
born
since...
months of leave
reserved to the
mother (mater-
nity leave)
additional months
of leave (parental
leave)
months of entitle-
ment to mater-
nity/parental
leave benefits∗
..1968 2 0 0
..1979 2 4 6
..1986 2 8 10
..1.1.1987 2 10 12
..1.7.1989 2 13 15
..1.7.1990 2 16 18
..1.1.1992 2 34 18
..1.1.1993 2 34 24
..1994 2 34 24
..1996 2 34 24
..1.1. 2001 2 34 24
Notes: Periods are counted from birth of the child. Maternity leave is reserved to
the mother, while parental leave can be taken by the father as well since 1986. ∗
Benefits are means tested from 6th month onwards.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics - full time female workers excluding second births
Variable Sample of women with one birth Comparison
Before 1st Birth Spell before 1st Birth Spell after 1st Birth After Birth
Unskilled
age 22.83 (3.58) 24.16 (3.75) 24.56 (3.72) 26.28 (4.07) 29.40 ( 4.34 )
number of firms 0.87 (1.35) 0.88 (1.36) 0.98 (1.39) 1.39 (1.77) 1.20 ( 1.49 )
number of occupations 0.67 (1.11) 0.70 (1.14) 0.82 (1.19) 1.12 (1.47) 0.90 ( 1.21 )
unemployment (yrs) 0.15 (0.51) 0.17 (0.56) 0.23 (0.62) 0.38 (0.81) 0.39 ( 0.94 )
total time out of work (yrs) 0.66 (1.33) 0.71 (1.46) 1.74 (2.03) 2.17 (2.40) 1.74 ( 3.07 )
experience (yrs) 3.30 (3.21) 4.33 (3.53) 4.53 (3.29) 5.87 (3.76) 7.33 ( 5.06 )
log(wage) 4.41 (0.42) 4.47 (0.44) 4.35 (0.55) 4.43 (0.47) 4.67 ( 0.42 )
log(entry wage) 4.17 (0.43) 4.37 (0.37)
number of observations 31028 4269 2794 12784 5791
number of individuals 5393 4269 2794 3236 513
Skilled
age 23.57 ( 3.29 ) 25.44 (3.37) 26.02 (3.42) 27.22 (3.69) 29.25 (4.40)
number of firms 0.95 ( 1.33 ) 1.07 (1.41) 1.22 (1.46) 1.50 (1.66) 1.08 (1.54)
number of occupations 0.52 ( 0.94 ) 0.60 (1.01) 0.71 (1.08) 0.89 (1.25) 0.62 (1.14)
unemployment (yrs) 0.10 ( 0.36 ) 0.12 (0.41) 0.19 (0.49) 0.26 (0.58) 0.26 (0.69)
total time out of work (yrs) 0.27 ( 0.82 ) 0.33 (0.95) 1.36 (1.68) 1.58 (1.79) 0.80 (1.90)
experience (yrs) 3.37 ( 3.00 ) 4.93 (3.30) 5.13 (3.12) 6.16 (3.51) 7.37 (4.88)
log(wage) 4.54 ( 0.39 ) 4.66 (0.40) 4.38 (0.62) 4.51 (0.52) 4.78 (0.35)
log(entry wage) 4.23 (0.42) 4.48 ( 0.34)
number of observations 128879 14144 7411 26100 10138
number of individuals 18653 14144 7411 7897 822
Graduates
age 27.77 (3.75) 29.84 (3.37) 30.58 (3.46) 32.25 ( 4.04) 33.58 (4.17)
number of firms 0.78 (1.12) 0.91 (1.14) 0.98 (1.13) 1.30 ( 1.77) 0.86 (1.13)
number of occupations 0.44 (0.82) 0.49 (0.85) 0.53 (0.89) 0.61 ( 1.05) 0.45 (0.77)
unemployment (yrs) 0.09 (0.31) 0.11 (0.36) 0.15 (0.42) 0.22 ( 0.54) 0.27 (0.76)
total time out of work (yrs) 1.27 (2.24) 1.29 (2.29) 2.07 (2.60) 2.05 ( 2.39) 1.34 (2.42)
experience (yrs) 2.48 (2.59) 3.75 (2.80) 4.14 (2.61) 5.71 ( 3.61) 4.50 (4.02)
log(wage) 4.94 (0.43) 5.06 (0.40) 4.86 (0.67) 5.00 ( 0.57) 5.12 (0.37)
log(entry wage) 4.69 ( 0.47) 4.88 ( 0.39)
number of observations 7344 880 485 1652 4584
number of individuals 1277 880 485 521 492
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sample includes records
before and after the first birth, excluding periods after a second interruption. The
control group is defined as women who have had no child by the age of 35, conditional
on the fact that we observe them in the data until age 35.
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The probability of returning to full-time work after first birth
Year of start of interruption
 Returning within one year  Returning within two years
 Returning within three years
80 85 90 95
.2
.4
.6
.8
Figure 2:
50
Table 3: Comparison between women who return within 3 years and
those who do not return
age experience log(wage) No. of obs.
before 1st birth before 1st birth before 1st birth (%)
Unskilled/Low skilled
not return 23.661 (.149) 3.828 (.153) 4.371 (.020) 620 (19.2)
return to full time 23.007 (.066) 3.902 (.065) 4.431 (.008) 2162 (67.1)
return to part time 24.297 (.145) 4.965 (.154) 4.566 (.020) 437 (13.5)
Skilled
not return 24.774 (.067) 4.413 (.071) 4.555 (.009) 2228 (22.6)
return to full time 24.383 (.039) 4.348 (.038) 4.583 (.004) 5617 (56.9)
return to part time 25.147 (.061) 5.016 (.065) 4.710 (.008) 2012 (20.4)
Graduates
not return 29.472 (.387) 3.016 (.308) 4.952 (.046) 91 (19.4)
return to full time 29.028 (.193) 3.637 (.153) 4.992 (.024) 282 (60.2)
return to part time 29.231 (.298) 3.374 (.261) 5.034 (.036) 95 (20.2)
Notes: Excluded are individuals not returning within three years and starting leave
after 1992. The total number of women working in full-time work before interruption
is 19293. We drop from those 5257 who start leave after 1992 and 492 who do not
return within three years.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on the mean wage loss in percentages
(standard errors are reported in parentheses)
all firm stayer firm and
occupation stayer
Unskilled/Low skilled
Full time, Real Loss 9.7 8.8 9.0
(.010) (.011) (.011)
Full and Part time, Real Loss 16.3 13.2 13.3
(.009) (.009 ) (.01 )
Full time, Nominal Loss 7.4 7.1 7.3
( .01 ) (.011 ) ( .011 )
Skilled
Full time, Real Loss 24.3 25.0 25.2
(.007) (.008 ) (.008 )
Full and Part time, Real Loss 33.7 31.5 31.3
(.005 ) (.006 ) (.006 )
Full time, Nominal Loss 21.9 23.3 23.5
(.007 ) (.008 ) (.008 )
Graduates
Full time, Real Loss 16.9 18.2 18.4
(.028) (.03) ( .03 )
Full and Part time, Real Loss 25.3 24.0 23.8
( .02 ) (.022 ) (.022 )
Full time, Nominal Loss 14.9 16.8 17.0
(.028 ) (.03 ) (.03 )
Notes: The loss is calculated as the mean of the diﬀerence between the log real wage
in the last spell before the first interruption and the first spell after the interruption.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Impact of children on working hours for full time working women
Children in the household
Two years prior One year prior One year after
to the birth to the birth the birth
Oﬃcial working hours 39.14 39.03 39.25
Actual working hours 42.75 42.43 42.93
No. obs. 77 77 77
Notes: Data source: Sample of 20-40 year old women from German Socio Economic
Panel, own calculations.
Table 6: Labour income for full time working women
Children in the household
No children Infants (0-1 years old) Children (above 2)
Regular Salary (in 1995 DM) 57,833 52,503 54,094
Bonus Payment (in 1995 DM) 2,622 1,981 1,795
Total Labour income (in 1995 DM) 60,454 54,481 55,889
Bonus ratio (in percentages) 4.9 3.9 3.4
No. obs 819 71 690
Notes: Data source: Sample of 20-40 year old women from German Socio Economic
Panel, own calculations.
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Table 7: The 3-phase model estimates in first diﬀerences for the sample of women
who give birth, IABS 1981-1995
FD-estimates IV-FD estimates
Unskilled Skilled Graduates Unskilled Skilled Graduates
Wage growth before first birth
∆Experience 0.039* 0.048* 0.044* 0.044* 0.050* 0.061*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012)
∆Experience2 -0.001 -0.008* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
∆Unemployment 0.018 -0.018 -0.035 -0.247* -0.091 -0.205
(0.015) (0.012) (0.054) (0.098) (0.069) (0.179)
Firm change within 3 years -0.003 -0.003 0.042 -0.005 -0.004 0.055*
before mat. leave (0.014) (0.005) (0.022) (0.020) (0.008) (0.027)
Occupation change within 3 0.009 -0.027* -0.005 0.018 -0.035* -0.002
years before mat. leave (0.015) (0.007) (0.036) (0.020) (0.009) (0.038)
Within 3 years before 0.002 0.011* 0.007 -0.002 0.008* -0.001
mat. leave (DIP) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
Wage over the interruption in connection with first birth
Duration of interruption -0.051* -0.126* -0.058* -0.035* -0.147* -0.039
(0.009) (0.005) (0.020) (0.014) (0.009) (0.025)
Firm change* (mat. leave) -0.023 -0.024 0.027 -0.089* -0.021 0.002
(0.034) (0.016) (0.067) (0.039) (0.018) (0.074)
Occ. change*(mat.leave) -0.009 -0.016 -0.065 -0.041 -0.022 -0.079
(0.037) (0.021) (0.094) (0.039) (0.022) (0.097)
Wage growth after first birth
∆Experience 0.049* 0.063* 0.022 0.062* 0.091* 0.047
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.017) (0.010) (0.026)
∆Experience2 -0.001* -0.002* 0.001 -0.002* -0.003* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
∆Unemployment -0.048* -0.089* -0.209* -0.244* -0.355* -0.201
(0.020) (0.020) (0.085) (0.146) (0.145) (0.472)
Other controls
Firm change 0.037* 0.056* 0.024 0. 072* 0.066* 0.028
(0.008) (0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.020)
Occupation change 0.007 0.016* 0.022 0.022 0.027* 0.034
(0.009) (0.005) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007) (0.027)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio -0.030* -0.043* -0.011 -0.055* -0.057* -0.035
(0.011) (0.005) (0.020) (0.012) (0.005) (0.022)
∆Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observation 19,439 73,847 3798 19,439 73,847 3798
Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors
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Table 8: Model Estimates in First Diﬀerences for the sample of women
who do not give birth, IABS 1981-1995
FD-estimates IV-FD estimates
Unskilled Skilled Graduates Unskilled Skilled Graduates
Wage growth
∆Experience 0.039* 0.019* 0.029* 0.037* 0.020* 0.018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
∆Experience2 -0.001* -0.000* -0.000* -0.002* -0.001* 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Unemployment -0.066* -0.047* -0.003 -0.380* -0.253* -0.154*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.088) (0.073) (0.066)
Other controls
Firm change 0.042* 0.046* 0.022* 0.101* 0.075* 0.042*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014)
Occupation change 0.008 -0.000 0.021 0.043* 0.017* 0.038
(0.012) (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.022 0.003 0.018 0.007 -0.002 0.014
(0.020) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021)
∆Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observation 10,34 19,634 3,954 10,347 19,634 3,954
Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors
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